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I. INTRODUCTION 
Fasten your seatbelts. The flight is about to begin. The title of 
the present Article is a carry-forward from an article published a few 
years ago.1 The two-headed nightingale refers to the views held by 
Jan Paulsson and Albert Jan van den Berg. Albert Jan van den Berg 
had called on “party-appointed arbitrators [to] observe the principle: 
nemine dissentiente.”2 Jan Paulsson took the first public position 
advocating abolition of the present system in which two party-
appointed arbitrators decide, by one means or another, on someone to 
preside over the tribunal. Jan Paulsson has not stopped selling his 
brand of medicine,3 and the same goes for Albert Jan van den Berg.4 
The purpose of this article is to furnish its reader with more sensible 
counterarguments to those proposing elimination of conventional 
investor-State arbitration. 
 
1. See generally Charles N. Brower & Charles B. Rosenberg, The Death of the Two-
Headed Nightingale: Why the Paulsson-van den Berg Presumption that Party-Appointed 
Arbitrators are Untrustworthy is Wrongheaded, 29 ARB. INT’L 7 (2013). 
2. Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in 
Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 821, 834 (Mahnoush Arsanjani et. al.eds. 2010). 
3. See, e.g., JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION (2013). See generally Jan 
Paulsson, Sore Losers and What to Do About Them (Mar. 17, 2017) (unpublished notes) (The 
authors received these notes from Paulsson.); Jan Paulsson, Shall We Have an Adult 
Conversation About Legitimacy? (Mar. 2, 2017) in THE BLOG OF THE CPR (Mar. 15, 2017), 
https://blog.cpradr.org/2017/03/15/shall-we-have-an-adult-conversation-about-legitimacy/.    
Professor Paulsson’s arguments in his book and lectures are largely repetitive of his 
original points contained in, see generally Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International 
Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L. J.  339 (2010). Many of these points 
have been addressed in Brower, supra note 1 (The points he makes in his book and lectures 
overlap somewhat, but they are not identical and cover different grounds.). 
4. See generally Albert Jan van den Berg, Charles Brower’s Problem With 100 Percent – 
Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, 31 ARB. INT’L 
381 (2015). 
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II. THE COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC AND TRADE 
AGREEMENT – POLITICS ABOUND 
The new head-scratcher is the international investment court 
proposed by the European Commission and its unlikely survival on 
the back of a fifteen-headed hydra. Why choose a mythical creature? 
Because it is not real and the bench of the international investment 
court is to be filled by fifteen judges “appointed” exclusively by 
States. 
As a yet non-working example, the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (“CETA”) between the European Union and 
Canada sets out the appointment procedure prescribes five 
appointments by Canada, five appointments by some means by the 
twenty-seven (post-Brexit) Member States of the European Union, 
and another five appointments from other nationalities commonly 
agreed by the two treaty parties.5 Notably, appointment of these 
judges will involve a political “scrum.” 
There is no way of depoliticizing any process in which States or 
international organizations are the source of appointments or 
elections. Even elections to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
are politicized. Most recently, there was an almighty heave-to going 
on between the General Assembly and the Security Council of the 
United Nations over the re-election of British ICJ Judge Sir 
Christopher Greenwood and, for the first time in its seventy-one-year 
history, the ICJ does not have a member from each of the five 
Permanent Members of the Security Council.6 It is political. Even the 
church hierarchy is well known to be political, as is known well 
before the smoke rises when a new Pope is chosen. 
Simply put, when viewed from a pragmatic and realistic 
perspective, there is no way of depoliticizing the appointment process 
of the proposed international investment court. There are twenty-
eight, soon to be twenty-seven, Member States of the European 
Union, which possess a collection of increasingly differing views 
towards the rule of law. It will be a rough-and-tumble political contest 
 
5. Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement between Canada, of the One Part, and the 
European Union and Its Member States, of the Other Part, art. 8.27, Sept. 14, 2016 (entered 
into force provisionally Sept. 21, 2017) [hereinafter CETA]. 
6. Owen Bowcott, No British judge on world court for first time in its 71-year history, 
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2017, 6:21 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/nov/20/ 
no-british-judge-on-world-court-for-first-time-in-its-71-year-history [http://perma.cc/6MYG-
P4JB]. 
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before they agree on their five judges. Canada is not that much better 
off, given the Maritime Provinces, Quebec, the Prairie Provinces, and 
the West Coast. It took Canada almost fifty years to become a party to 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID”)7 and for the past 
thirty-five years Quebec has continued to withhold its consent to 
Canada’s Constitution for reasons that include, inter alia, its desire 
for constitutionally guaranteed Quebec representation on Canada’s 
apex court.8 
And, how will the treaty parties unite on the selection of the five 
third-country judges? Those third-country candidates are the most 
important, because only they are allowed to be President or Vice 
President of the overall court,9 and only they are able to preside over a 
first instance three-member panel.10 There just is no way of insulating 
the process from politics. 
Similarly, an alarm may be sounded for the appellate instance, 
which has the power not just to review issues of law but also to re-
determine the facts.11 Who are these people going to be? 
Undoubtedly, the establishment of such a court also becomes an 
expensive process. There are numerous historical and contemporary 
examples of budget concerns affecting public acceptance of an 
international court or tribunal. The International Criminal Court in 
The Hague and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia are recent examples of unanticipated enormous budgetary 
hits.12 Who is going to pay for the international investment court? 
That is not entirely clear. 
 
7. Canada ratified the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and National of Other States on November 1, 2013, see generally DATABASE 
OF ICSID MEMBER STATES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-
States.aspx [http://perma.cc/CD2P-D6Y3] (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
8. Amy Minsky, After 35 years, why does Quebec want in the Constitution?, GLOBAL 
NEWS (June 2, 2017), https://globalnews.ca/news/3496355/quebec-canada-constitution-
amend-reopen/ [http://perma.cc/RM6C-GP9L]. 
9.   CETA, supra note 5, art. 8.27(8). 
10. Id. art. 8.27(6). 
11. Id. art. 8.28(2)(b). 
12. See, e.g., John Silverman, Ten years, $900m, one verdict: Does the ICC cost too 
much?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17351946 [http://
perma.cc/DG7H-TBTZ] (reporting that the estimated expenditure of the International Criminal 
Court was around $900 million for its first ten years with only one verdict and that the annual 
budget for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia had increased 500-
fold from its inception until 2010-11). 
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Lack of security of tenure for appointed judges poses a barrier to 
attracting competent and qualified individuals. To enhance their 
independence, judges are barred from being involved in arbitrations 
otherwise,13 but they are to be compensated well below the salaries of 
judges of other permanent international fora.14 Thus although the 
judges are expected to “be available at all times and on short notice,” 
they would be paid a monthly retainer fee, suggested by the European 
Union to be around EU€2000,15 with the President and the Vice 
President potentially receiving EU€7000 a month.16 Given these terms 
of service, the pool of available appointees predictably will be largely 
comprised of retired civil servants, who may or may not know much, 
if anything, about the field, retired judges who have limited 
experience interpreting and applying international law, and other 
friends of politicians, all seeking an opportunity to augment their 
pensions. They will be representative of the least common 
denominator selected through the process of attrition that 
characterizes political compromise. 
III. THE STATES’ REPOSSESSION EFFORTS 
Proposing the replacement of investor-State arbitration as it 
currently exists with a permanent court is a paramount example of a 
larger movement by States actively to “repossess” investor-State 
arbitration. The chief repo-man is the Government of the United 
States. This has been occurring irrespective of which party controls 
the Administration and despite the fact that foreign investor-claimants 
 
         13. Commission Press Release IP/15/5651, ch. II, art. 11(1) (Sept. 19, 2015) (“In 
addition, upon appointment, [the Members of the Tribunal] shall refrain from acting as counsel 
in any pending or new investment protection dispute under this or any other agreement or 
domestic law.”). A similarly worded provision is found in CETA itself. See CETA, supra note 
5, at Ch. 8. § F. Art. 8.30 (“In addition, upon appointment, [the Members of the Tribunal] shall 
refrain from acting as counsel or as party-appointed expert or witness in any pending or new 
investment dispute under this or any other international agreement.”). 
14. For example, as of 2016, each member of the International Court of Justice received 
an annual salary of US$172,978 with a supplementary allowance of US$15,000 for the 
President. Upon leaving the Court, judges receive an annual pension, which, after a nine-year 
term of office, is equal to 50 per cent of the annual base salary. See Members of the Court, 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/en/members [https://perma.cc/
4B5T-GULW] (last visited Mar. 14, 2018). 
15. Commission Press Release, supra note 13, ch. II, art. 9(12). 
16. Id. ch. II, art.10(12). 
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are disproportionately US nationals.17 States, concerned about their 
own treasury, sacrifice their own nationals who invest abroad by 
reducing their protections in treaties, by interpreting their way — or 
wanting to interpret their way — out of treaty protections, and others 
by denouncing treaties. 
As a representative example of States’ repossession efforts, one 
may recall how the United States, Canada, and Mexico banded 
together following a certain stage of the Pope & Talbot case.18 The 
US Claimant commenced arbitration against Canada, which it 
claimed had violated the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”) Chapter 11 requirement that its investment in Canada 
receive “fair and equitable treatment.”19 The Canadian Government 
argued to the Pope & Talbot tribunal, however, that as written in 
NAFTA, fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) could mean no more 
than the level of treatment accorded to alien investors under 
customary international law, rather than the higher standard, 
independent of customary international law, generally applied by 
other, non-NAFTA tribunals.20 The Tribunal ruled unanimously for 
the Claimant, however, expressly rejecting Canada’s argument as 
being “patently absurd.”21 Just over three months later that “patently 
absurd” interpretation was adopted by the three NAFTA State Parties 
as an official interpretation binding under NAFTA22 pursuant to 
Articles 2001 and 1131, which fairly promptly was denounced by 
Judge Sir Robert Jennings, then lately President of the International 
Court of Justice, “as an attempted amendment that has no binding 
 
17. Of the 806 cases (concluded and pending) listed on UNCTAD’s Investment Policy 
Hub, Americans have acted as Claimants in 152. In other words, 18.9% of all known ISDS 
cases involved or involve American Claimants.  See Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, 
INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry 
[https://perma.cc/5B9G-C3NL] (last updated July 31, 2017). 
18. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, (Apr. 10, 2001). 
19.  Id. ¶ 105. 
20.  Id. ¶ 108-09. 
21. Id. ¶ 118. 
22. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
Provisions, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (July 31, 2001), 
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp [https://perma.cc/
7FJA-Q4SW] (“The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and 
security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”). 
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effect.”23 Such actions obviously weaken alien trust in government 
with respect to the protection of investors abroad. 
Remarkably, this position was a complete about-face for the 
United States, for as Dr. Todd Weiler has demonstrated, it was the 
United States that had invented FET years before Pope & Talbot and 
NAFTA, and purposefully tailored it to be a higher standard than 
customary international law, entirely separate from and independent 
of it.24 
In the end, very little, if anything, was achieved by the NAFTA 
States party to the official interpretation prompted by the Pope & 
Talbot case. Both “fair and equitable treatment” and “customary 
international law” are what Professor W. Michael Reisman has 
described as “evaluation rules” that “establish a goal that is expressed 
at some level of generality.”25 Evaluation rules are contrasted with 
“[v]erification rules” which: 
“are binary, ‘either-or rules.’ Beyond that binary information, the 
factual and normative universe to which the person charged with 
applying the rules may turn is strictly confined to a few explicit 
variables, none of which includes general evaluative concepts 
such as fairness, equity, justice, minimum order, efficiency, or 
even common sense.”26  
Professor Reisman further surmised that “each instance of application 
of evaluation rules such as FET and MST [i.e., minimum standard of 
treatment] re-instantiates them in different contexts, they can scarcely 
avoid evolving, a fortiori, as social, economic, technological, moral, 
and ethical variables change.”27 In other words, the States are 
constantly making and remaking customary international law. This 
was confirmed in part by Professor James Crawford, Judge Stephen 
Schwebel, and The Right Honourable Sir Ninian Stephen, in the 
 
23. Methanex v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, (Sept. 6, 2001), at 6 (referring to 
the Second Opinion of Professor Sir Robert Jennings, Q.C.). 
24. See TODD WEILER, THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: 
EQUALITY, DISCRIMINATION AND MINIMUM STANDARDS OF TREATMENT IN HISTORICAL 
CONTEXT 167 (Martinus Nijhoff ed. 2013). See also KENNETH J VANDEVELDE, U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 263 (Oxford University Press 2009). 
25. W. Michael Reisman, Canute Confronts the Tide: States vs. Tribunals and the 
Evolution of the Minimum Standard in Customary International Law (Apr. 9, 2015), in, 109 
PROC. OF THE ANN. MEETING OF THE AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 125 (2015) at 125. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 127. 
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Mondev NAFTA case, in which it was made clear that customary 
international law evolves.28 
Consider also the 2012 United States Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty29 and one will see that the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
and his treaty counterpart can jointly preclude an investor-State 
arbitration from ever happening. If the two decide that a claimed 
expropriation based on a tax measure was not an expropriation, the 
claimant is out of luck.30 And, there is an analogous provision with 
respect to various defenses.31 
A. The European Union and its Existential Crisis 
While the European Commission is the originator—hence main 
promoter of a permanent investment court—, it may not be the only 
EU institution that is contributing to establishing a permanent 
investment court. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”) is taking a conspicuous role in the debate as is evident by a 
series of decisions. 
In 2017, the European Commission was confident that the EU’s 
Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”) with Singapore, its first, and all 
future EU trade and investment treaties would fall within its exclusive 
competence (Article 207 of the Treaty of the European Union 
(“TFEU”)), including the treaties’ dispute resolution provisions.32 
This appears no longer to be the case in light of a CJEU Opinion 
issued in May 2017. The issue before the CJEU was whether the EU-
Singapore FTA required ratification by each of the EU Member 
States.33 The CJEU noted that the Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(“ISDS”) regime removes disputes from the jurisdiction of the 
national courts of the Member States and thus is not “of a purely 
ancillary nature . . . and cannot, therefore, be established without the 
 
28. See generally Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award (Oct. 11, 2002).  
29. See generally United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012). 
30. Id. art. 21(2). 
31. Id. art. 31. See generally, Charles N. Brower & Sarah Melikian, “We Have Met the 
Enemy and He Is Us!” Is the Industrialized North “Going South” on Investor-State 
Arbitration? 31 ARB. INT’L 19 (2015). 
32. Opinion Pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, Opinion 2/15 Of the Court,  
EU:C:2017:376, 2017, ¶¶ 10-16, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
CELEX:62015CV0002(01) [https://perma.cc/XKE4-7CZ7]. 
33.   Id. ¶ 29. 
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Member States’ consent.”34 Inasmuch as the EU-Singapore FTA 
included a basically conventional ISDS provision, Canada and the 
European Union have felt constrained to exclude the investment court 
system contained in CETA from even the provisional application of 
CETA.35 Thus the CJEU will require all EU Member States’ 
ratification of any EU treaties that include that court provision, 
including CETA. The EU treaty negotiators may have to be clever 
and slide some substantive trade benefits into the agreement to 
encourage ratification. 
Rallying all EU Member States to agree on a treaty is 
challenging as there are different views. The Advocate General 
Melchior Wathelet at the CJEU has rendered a non-binding (but 
frequently persuasive) opinion with respect to a request for a 
preliminary ruling submitted by the German Federal Court of Justice 
in May 2016 to the CJEU concerning the Netherlands-Slovakia 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”).36 The German court had referred 
a series of questions concerning the compatibility of intra-EU BITs 
with EU law.37 The German court’s questions arose in the context of 
an application by the Slovak Republic to annul an arbitral award 
issued in favor of Achmea (formerly Eureko), a Dutch investor, under 
the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT.38 
The intriguing features of the opinion, however, were the 
Advocate General’s observations on the EU Member States’ 
contradictory ISDS practices. 
The Advocate General noted that several EU Member States had 
intervened in the proceedings and made both oral and written 
submissions.39 He noted that the intervening EU Member States could 
be divided into two groups.40 The first group consists of States that 
“are essentially countries of origin of the investors and therefore 
 
34.   Id. ¶ 292. 
35. CETA Explained, EUROPEAN COMMISSION http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-
focus/ceta/ceta-explained/index_en.htm (last updated Sept. 21, 2017). 
36. See generally Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Slovak Republic v. Achmea 
BV, Case C-284/16, [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:699, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:62016CC0284 [https://perma.cc/YSS9-4CPF]. 
37.   Id.¶ 30. 
38. See generally Advocate General of EU Court of Justice rejects contentions that 
intra-EU bilateral investment treaty is incompatible with EU law, IAREPORTER (Sept. 19, 
2017), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/28492/ [https://perma.cc/WQN9-KG5R]. 
39.  Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Slovak Republic, Case C-284/16, ¶¶ 31-35.  
40.  Id.  ¶ 34. 
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never or rarely respondents in arbitral proceedings launched by 
investors[.]”41 These States are the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of 
Austria, and the Republic of Finland.42 The second group consists of 
States that “have all been respondents in a number of arbitral 
proceedings relating to intra-EU investments.”43 These States are the 
Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Hellenic Republic, the 
Kingdom of Spain, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the 
Republic of Latvia, Hungary, the Republic of Poland, Romania, and 
the Slovak Republic.44 
The Advocate General noted that it was “hardly surprising” that 
the second group of EU Member States “intervened in support of the 
argument put forward by the Slovak Republic, which is itself the 
respondent to the investment arbitration at issue in the present case.”45 
Yet he found it “surprising” that the same States, with the exception 
of Italy, had not moved to terminate their respective intra-EU BITs, 
which, thus, remained in force in whole or in part.46 When Slovakia 
was asked at the hearing why it had not terminated its other BITs with 
the States in the second group, Slovakia admitted “that its objective 
was to ensure that its own investors would not be the victims of 
discrimination by comparison with investors from other Member 
States in the Member States with which it would no longer have 
BITs.”47 
The Advocate General’s opinion speaks volumes regarding what 
the other EU organs may think of the European Commission’s 
campaign to end ISDS.  
Yet, the Advocate General’s opinion fell on deaf years as the 
CJEU ruled on March 6, 2018, that ISDS provisions in intra-EU BITs 
are incompatible with EU law.48 The decision prompted the 
 
41. Id.   
42.  Id. 
43. Id. 
44.  Id.  ¶ 35. 
45. Id. ¶ 36. 
46. Id. ¶ 37 (The Advocate General did, however, note that Italy was the only EU 
Member State falling within the second group that had moved to terminate its intra-EU BITs, 
with exception of the Italy-Malta BIT). 
47.  Id. ¶ 38. 
48. See generally Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV, Case C-284/16,  [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%
3A62016CJ0284 [https://perma.cc/HU9S-GFP4]. 
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Netherlands—one of the States falling under Advocate General 
Wathelet’s first group49—to announce reluctantly its decision to 
terminate all twelve of its intra-EU BITs.50  
The full implications of the CJEU’s opinion in Achmea are 
unclear, but it could be viewed as the CJEU forcing EU investors in 
other EU Member States to accept the EU Commission’s proposal to 
resolve all investment disputes through the permanent investment 
court. It seems other EU actors may have heard the rallying cry 
because their efforts to establish the permanent court were amped up 
following the Achmea decision.  
Two weeks after the Achmea decision, the EU Council issued a 
negotiating directive for establishing a permanent investment court 
for the settlement of investment disputes with the EU Commission 
designated as the authorized representative.51 All analysis and 
discussion concerning the proposal, according to the directive, 
“should be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”).”52 
Less than a month later, the EU Commission presented a final 
text of its agreement with Singapore to the EU Council as well as a 
new FTA, the latter of which displaces the previously agreed ISDS 
provision with the Investment Court System promoted by the EU and 
adopted in CETA.53 The EU Council will now adopt and sign the 
agreements before obtaining the EU Parliament’s consent.54 While the 
 
49.  Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Slovak Republic, Case C-284/16, ¶ 34. 
50.  Letter of Sigrid A.M. Kaag, Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister (Apr. 26, 2018). See 
Lacey Yong, Netherlands to terminate BIT with Slovakia in wake of Achmea, GLOB. ARB. 
REV. (May 2, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1168905/netherlands-to-
terminate-bit-with-slovakia-in-wake-of-achmea [http://perma.cc/JS8T-V2ZS].  
51. Note from the General Secretariat of the Council for the European Union to 
Delegations, about Negotiating directives for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for 
the settlement of investment disputes, 12981/17 ADD 1 DCL 1 (Mar. 20, 2018); Sebastian 
Perry, EU Council gives go-ahead for talks on multilateral court, GLOB. ARB. REV. (Mar. 21, 
2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1167071/eu-council-gives-go-ahead-for-
talks-on-multilateral-court [http://perma.cc/K8MT-WFU6]. 
52. Note from the General Secretariat of the Council for the European Union to 
Delegations, about Negotiating directives for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for 
the settlement of investment disputes, supra note 51, ¶ 4. 
53.   See EU-Singapore trade and investment agreements (authentic texts as of April 
2018), FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (APR. 18, 2018), EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961 [https://perma.cc/487B-SFG2]; Lacey 
Yong, EU unveils new investment agreements with Singapore, GLOB. ARB. REV. (Apr. 20, 
2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1168166/eu-unveils-new-investment-
agreement-with-singapore [https://perma.cc/9YF7-3GD3]. 
54.  Yong, supra note 53. 
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FTA will take effect in 2019, the investment protection agreement 
will take effect following the ratification by each EU Member 
State55—a move necessary in light of the CJEU’s ruling discussed 
earlier concerning the EU-Singapore FTA. 
On the heels of announcing the final EU-Singapore agreements, 
the EU and Mexico unveiled an “agreement in principle” in which the 
Contracting Parties agreed to establish a permanent investment court 
to resolve investment disputes.56 
It may be wrong to presume that the CJEU is a promoter of the 
EU Commission’s permanent investment court. On September 6, 
2017, Belgium formally asked the CJEU to assess the compatibility of 
the CETA’s Investment Court System with EU law.  Specifically, 
Belgium has asked whether the “Investment Court System” is 
compatible with EU citizens’ right of access to courts, the “general 
principle of equality,” and the CJEU's exclusive competence over EU 
law and how the proposed court would affect the “right to an 
independent and impartial judiciary.”57 The CJEU has yet to issue an 
opinion on the issue and, thus, it remains to be seen whether the 
CJEU truly joins its fellow EU institutions in preferring the EU-
proposed permanent court. 
IV. OTHER ACTORS PROMOTING THE REVOLT AGAINST THE 
CURRENT ISDS FRAMEWORK 
A. The CIDS Report and its Supplement 
The newest, and most directly serious threat to ISDS as presently 
known and favored overwhelmingly by its users, however, comes in 
the form of a 115-page “research paper . . . prepared for . . . 
UNCITRAL [United Nations Commission on International Trade 
 
55.   Id. 
56.  See New EU-Mexico Agreement, The Agreement in Principle, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (Apr. 23, 2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1833 
[https://perma.cc/H7YQ-H59P]. 
57. See Douglas Thomson, ECJ to rule on CETA investment court, GLOB. ARB. NEWS 
(Sept. 6, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1147140/ecj-to-rule-on-ceta-
investment-court [https://perma.cc/4N6D-H29A]; Damien Charlotin, ANALYSIS: EU’s highest 
court is asked once more to weigh in on international investment law questions – this time by 
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Law] [at its request] within the framework of a project of the Geneva 
Center of International Dispute Settlement (‘CIDS’)”58 by Professor 
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, that Center’s Co-Director, and Dr. 
Michele Potestà, a Senior Researcher at that Center (“CIDS Report”). 
This was presented to the UNCITRAL Commission by way of a note 
prepared by the UNCITRAL Secretariat dated May 24, 2016, 59 and 
most recently was discussed extensively at the UNCITRAL 
Commission’s 50th Session in Vienna held July 3-21, 2017,60 
following the holding of an “UNCITRAL-CIDS Government Expert 
Meeting” in Geneva March 2-3, 2017.61 
The opening paragraph of the Executive Summary of this 
“research paper” summarizes its mission as being “to analyze whether 
the Mauritius Convention on Transparency could provide a useful 
model for broader reform of the investor-State arbitration 
framework.”62 Specifically, it “proposes a possible roadmap that 
could be followed if States were to decide to pursue a reform 
initiative aimed at replacing or supplementing the existing investor-
State arbitration regime in international investment agreements (IIAs) 
with a permanent investment tribunal and/or an appeal mechanism for 
investor-State arbitral awards.”63 
Notwithstanding the “research” character of the CIDS paper 
commissioned by UNCITRAL, it appears to lend considerable 
support in substance to the “Fifteen-Headed Hydra” threatening ISDS 
as it presently exists and to point towards the European Union’s goal 
 
58. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, Can the Mauritius Convention serve 
as a model for the reform of investor-State arbitration in connection with the introduction of a 
permanent investment tribunal or an appeal mechanism?: Analysis and roadmap, GENEVA 
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT [CIDS], 5 (June 3, 2016). 
59. Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Presentation of a 
Research Paper on the Mauritius Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State 
Arbitration as a Possible Model for Further Reforms of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, ¶¶ 
3-5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/890 (May 24, 2016). 
          60. See Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law at its Fiftieth Session, Supplement 
No. 17, ¶¶ 240-65, U.N. Doc. A/72/17 (July 2017); Professor Nikos Lavranos, The first steps 
towards a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC), EFILA BLOG (July 19, 2017), 
https://efilablog.org/2017/07/19/the-first-steps-towards-a-multilateral-investment-court-mic/ 
[https://perma.cc/EUV4-UDDH]. 
61. See generally Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement. UNCITRAL-CIDS 
Government Expert Meeting, CIDS – GENEVA CTR FOR INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT, 
http://www.cids.ch/events-2/past-events/634-2/ [https://perma.cc/PC9N-URJ3] (last visited 
Apr. 29, 2018). 
62.  Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, at 4. 
63. Id. at 4. 
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of establishing an Investment Court System, otherwise termed a 
fifteen-Judge International Investment Court.64 Specifically, the CIDS 
Report focuses primarily on whether an award by a hypothetical 
permanent court could be enforced under the New York Convention 
(“NY Convention”).65 
The CIDS Report notes that the NY Convention does not define 
“arbitration,” “arbitral tribunal” or “arbitral award” but that Article 
I(2) of the NY Convention mentions awards by “permanent arbitral 
bodies.”66 By considering the travaux préparatoires of “permanent 
arbitral bodies” under Article I of the NY Convention, the Iran-United 
 
64. Id. ¶ 93. 
65.  Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, at ¶¶ 138. 
66. Article I of the NY Convention: 
 
1. The Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the 
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of 
differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to 
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their 
recognition and enforcement are sought. 
 
2. The term “arbitral awards” shall include not only awards made by arbitrators 
appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to 
which the parties have submitted. 
 
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. I, 
opened for signature June 10, 1958 (entered into force on June 7, 1959) (emphasis added).  
There is an open query as to whether the IUSCT is a “permanent arbitral bod[y]” under Article 
I(2) of the NY Convention. See The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran art. III, ¶ 4, Jan. 
19, 1981 (“Claims Settlement Declaration”) (setting a deadline for filing claims with the 
IUSCT both by nationals of the United States against Iran and nationals of Iran against the 
United States, as well as for claims by either of the two States party to that Declaration against 
the other based on contracts for the purchase and sale of goods and services) (“No claim may 
be filed with the Tribunal more than one year after the entry into force of this Agreement or six 
months after the date the President is appointed, whichever is later. These deadlines do not 
apply to the procedures contemplated by Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Declaration of the 
Government of Algeria of January 19, 1981.”); see also Re: Refusal to Accept the Claim of Mr. 
Victor E. Pereira, Decision No. DEC 2-Ref 5-2, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Mar. 10, 
1982), reprinted in 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, at 3 (“Since the President was appointed on June 
4, 1981, the last day on which the noted claims could be filed was January 19, 1982.”); CHARLES 
N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 95 
(1998). 
The exception to the January 19, 1982, deadline are interpretive disputes (or “A” claims) 
between the United States and Iran. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Algeria, ¶¶ 16-17, January 19, 1981 (“General Declaration”). 
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States Claims Tribunal (“IUSCT”) and sport-based arbitral 
institutions, the CIDS Report opines that awards by such institutions 
may be enforced under the NY Convention.67 This is despite the fact 
that those bodies were not formed by unilateral appointments of the 
respective nationals who presented the vast bulk of the claims subject 
to the IUSCT’s jurisdiction or of athletes whose complaints are 
subjected to the jurisdiction of sport-based arbitral institutions.68 
Turning, then, from what had been posed as an enforcement 
issue, the CIDS Report concludes that because the IUSCT is an 
example of an “arbitration” in which the U.S. claimants had no say in 
the appointment of the arbitrators deciding their cases,69 it justifies 
more broadly the envisaged International Investment Court. 
Enforcement of IUSCT awards did not raise issues “about the fact 
that [the Tribunal’s] composition did not reflect traditional methods 
of appointment in international arbitration.” 70 Rather, it was debated 
whether the IUSCT awards were rendered under the Dutch lex arbitri 
or were “a-national” and whether there was an arbitration agreement 
in writing. 71 
This leap from enforceability to per se justification of investor-
State arbitration as presently known now being replaced by an 
International Investment Court, however, wholly disregards the fact 
that the IUSCT was established through negotiations that took place 
starting only early in November 1980 and until the conclusion of the 
Algiers Accords on January 19, 1981.72 The negotiations, conducted 
via Algeria as intermediary, had as their principal object the release of 
52 American hostages. Save for two of the American hostages, all 
were United States diplomatic or consular officers, and all had been 
held captive for 444 days.73 The Iranian seizure had resulted in two 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions,74 an order of the 
International Court of Justice,75 long ignored by Iran, compelling the 
 
67.  Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, ¶¶ 95-96, 148-54. 
68.  Id. 
69. Id. ¶ 94. 
70. Id. ¶ 95. 
71. Id. 
72. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, 
http://www.iusct.net/ [https://perma.cc/7Q6K-WSUV] (last visited May 23, 2018). 
73. BROWER, supra note 66, at 4-5.  
74. See S.C. Res. 457 (Dec. 4, 1979); S.C. Res. 461 (Dec. 31, 1979). 
75. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Order on 
Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. Rep. at 17-18 (Dec. 15); United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep., ¶¶ 75, 91-92 (May. 24). 
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hostages’ release, and a failed US Army Delta Force raid at Desert 
One in Iran mounted to free the hostages.76 To rely on such a hurried 
solution of a serious international crisis as a model for normal 
investor-State arbitration is, frankly, beyond reason. It is equally true 
of the famous Alabama arbitration that benefitted the American 
shipowners whose vessels were sunk or burned by raiders from 
Confederate States during the American Civil War, i.e., the CSS 
Alabama and a number of others, and the American owners of cargos 
thereby lost. That arbitration forestalled incipient hostilities between 
the United Kingdom, which against the international laws incumbent 
on neutral States had suffered those raiders to be built in England,77 
and the United States, likewise had no arbitrators appointed by the 
shipowners and owners of lost cargos. Similar to the IUSCT, the 
United States and the United Kingdom appointed one arbitrator each, 
and agreed that three others would be appointed from Brazil, Italy, 
and Switzerland.78 It is simply illogical, indeed, unreasonable in the 
extreme, to cite a tribunal formed to resolve a pending front-page 
international crisis between two nations who are at daggers’ points as 
justifying deprivation of arbitrating parties’ historic enjoyment of the 
right to appoint arbitrators and collaborate in the selection of a 
tribunal chairperson. 
No less inapposite is the CIDS Report’s reliance on certain rules 
that “provide for the institution’s sole power to appoint the arbitrators, 
without any input from the parties.”79 As examples, however, the 
CIDS Report cites only the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) 
Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games, which state that the 
President of the ad hoc Division will appoint one or three arbitrators 
from a preselected list without the disputing parties’ input,80 and the 
Arbitration Rules of the Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (“BAT”), which 
provide that “all disputes before the BAT shall be decided by a single 
 
76. See Mark Bowden, The Desert One Debacle, THE ATLANTIC May 2006, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-desert-one-debacle/304803/ 
[https://perma.cc/VE5Z-E4JL]. 
77. U.S. Dep’t of State’s Office of the Historian, The Alabama Claims, 1862–1872 (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2018), https://history.state.gov/milestones/1861-1865/alabama [https://
perma.cc/K7RK-R23H]. 
78. V.V. Veeder, The Historical Keystone to International Arbitration: The Party-
Appointed Arbitrator - From Miami to Geneva, in PRACTICING VIRTUE: INSIDE 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 134 (David D. Caron et al., eds., 2015). 
79. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, at ¶ 96. 
80. Id.; Court of Arb. for Sport Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games art. 11. 
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Arbitrator appointed by the BAT President on a rotational basis from 
the published list of BAT arbitrators.”81 The CIDS Report concludes 
that while the parties have no influence on the composition of the 
panels before the CAS ad hoc division or before the BAT, “it is 
undisputed that these mechanisms are in the nature of arbitration.”82 
With respect, these are regulatory and disciplinary bodies whose 
authority the athletes involved necessarily accept as a condition of 
competing in the relevant sporting events. They are much like the 
national or regional authorities regulating the conduct of lawyers, 
physicians and other professionals. Obtaining a professional license, 
or entering into a competitive sporting event subject to the regulation 
of CAS or BAT, brings with it automatic subjection of oneself to the 
relevant regulatory authority. Those subject to CAS or BAT have no 
more expectation of enjoying the benefits of ISDS as presently known 
than does a member of the Bar of any country to be able to appoint 
someone to the disciplinary authority that exists for the profession. 
All in all, the CIDS Report dwells principally on what can be termed 
“arbitration,” rather than on the distinctions of genesis, character, or 
subject matter of the various fora.83 
Within the context of enforcement under the NY Convention, the 
CIDS Report concludes that the unilateral right of appointment is not 
as important as the parties’ consensual submission to arbitration.84 
There is no denying that party freedom is paramount and if parties 
choose to do away with their right of appointment that is their 
 
81. Basketball Arbitral Tribunal, Arbitration Rules art. 8.1 (2017). 
82. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, at ¶ 96. 
83. Given the large number of doping-related disputes in sport arbitrations, one 
commentator has even queried whether such disputes fall under the NY Convention given their 
non-commercial nature. See Roger Alford, Are CAS Arbitrations Governed by the New York 
Convention?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Mar. 8, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
2009/03/08/are-cas-arbitrations-governed-by-the-new-york-convention/?_ga=
2.156422331.1237221282.1499359155-1066329609.1481846792 [https://perma.cc/D5Y2-
5VP2]. This may explain, according to other commentators, how enforcement under the NY 
Convention of sport-based arbitral awards is not as important for commercial-based arbitral 
awards “because the sport governing bodies have internal enforcement mechanisms that are 
highly effective.” See DANIEL GIRSBERGER & NATHALIE VOSER, INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: COMPARATIVE AND SWISS PERSPECTIVES 489 (3d ed. 2016). The Swiss 
Supreme Court criticized “the lack of transparency of who nominated the arbitrators for their 
position on the list,” id., at 506. Commentators have described the lack of arbitrators “that 
represent athletes’ interests, but without transparency, an athlete has no way of knowing who 
those arbitrators are,” id. This only adds more credence to the significance of unilateral 
appointments. 
84. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, at ¶¶ 97-98. 
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prerogative. But the CIDS Report’s conclusion in relation to 
enforceability does nothing to undermine the long-established right of 
unilateral appointment, which is a fundamental—if not crucial—
feature of arbitration, especially of investor-State arbitration. 
The CIDS Report also draws its conclusions within the confines 
of the NY Convention, which is an important treaty in the history of 
arbitration, but cannot be representative of all that is regarded as 
“arbitration.” There is a litany of treaties and rules demonstrating the 
value of the unilateral right of appointment. The NY Convention’s 
scope being limited to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards and arbitration agreements, it “does not provide for any 
obligation to be met by the parties as to the number of arbitrators or 
the method of their appointment.”85 Facilitating the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards and arbitration agreements is 
undoubtedly vital if arbitration is to have teeth. What constitutes 
“arbitration” and how the tribunal is to be constituted are, however, 
equivalently important. These were intentionally left open in the NY 
Convention.86 To go from awards by “permanent arbitral bodies” 
being enforceable under the NY Convention to conclude that party-
appointment is not an essential feature of arbitration goes too far. The 
party-appointment procedure—let alone other features of the arbitral 
process—were simply not in the contemplation of the drafters of the 
NY Convention.87 
The NY Convention was one initiative amongst others 
spearheaded by the United Nations Economic and Social Council and 
its successors. “The evolution of an effective and trustworthy private 
international arbitration system over the last half a century has had 
three major strands,”88 of which the NY Convention was but one. The 
1976 (and 2010) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the 1985 Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (UNCITRAL Model 
 
85. ALFONSO GÓMEZ-ACEBO, PARTY-APPOINTED ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 26 (2016). 
86.  U.S. Dep’t of State’s Office of the Historian, supra note 77. 
87. See U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Economic and Social Council, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/2840 (Mar. 22, 1956). The 
Secretary-General prepared a memorandum for the ECOSOC on the draft Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and whether a conference should be 
called to address the topic. 
88. DAVID D. CARON & LEE M. CAPLAN, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES: A 
COMMENTARY 1-2 (2d ed. 2013). 
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Law) were the others,89 and both expressly provide unilateral right of 
appointment by disputing arbitrants.90 
To its credit, the CIDS Report recognizes the fact that 
appointment of judges to an International Investment Court solely by 
States or the EU alone necessarily raises justified doubts on the part 
of investors as to the true impartiality of such judges, and, therefore, 
emphasizes that the process should not be politicized.91 They query 
whether it is desirable that only States participate in the election 
process or whether the investors should also have a say.92 
It is unrealistic to believe that international organizations, 
including the European Union, and States will act utterly devoid of 
political considerations when making the appointments to an 
International Investment Court.93 
One of the co-authors of this Article, apart from experience in 
the United States Senate, the United States Department of State, and 
the White House, has for decades, in The Hague and at the United 
Nations in New York City, been observing elections to the ICJ. In 
fact, ICJ elections (excluding elections of nationals of the Permanent 
Five Members of the Security Council, until most recently, as noted 
above, the sitting British Judge was denied re-election) are highly 
political; and, hence, do involve tradeoffs and “deals.” It is an illusion 
to think that the process can be de-politicized. 
 
89. Id. 
90. See G.A. Res. 31/98,  art. 7(1), U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976) (“If three 
arbitrators are to be appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator. The two arbitrators 
thus appointed shall choose the third arbitrator who will act as the presiding arbitrator of the 
tribunal.”) (emphasis added); G.A. Res. 65/22,  U.N. Doc. A/65/465 (2010) (“If three 
arbitrators are to be appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator. The two arbitrators 
thus appointed shall choose the third arbitrator who will act as the presiding arbitrator of the 
arbitral tribunal.”) (emphasis added); U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 11(3), U.N. Doc. 
A/40/17, annex I (June 21, 1985) (“Failing such agreement, (a) in an arbitration with three 
arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators thus appointed 
shall appoint the third arbitrator; if a party fails to appoint the arbitrator within thirty days of 
receipt of a request to do so from the other party, or if the two arbitrators fail to agree on the 
third arbitrator within thirty days of their appointment, the appointment shall be made, upon 
request of a party, by the court or other authority specified in article 6.”) (emphasis added). 
91.  Basketball Arbitral Tribunal, supra note 81.  
92. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, at ¶¶ 166-69. 
93. The authors appear to accept that “some degree of politics in the selection process is 
unavoidable” as stated in their Supplemental Report issued in November 2017. See Gabrielle 
Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, The Composition of a Multilateral Investment Court 
and of an Appeal Mechanism for Investment Awards: CIDS Supplemental Report, GENEVA 
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT [CIDS], ¶ 109 (Nov. 15, 2017). 
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It is equally misguided to think that “a consultation of business 
organizations, i.e., organizations representative of investor 
interests,”94 will have a significant influence that will reduce the 
political character of such appointments. There is no obligation on 
States to follow any recommendation by such organizations on the 
composition of the hypothetical permanent investment court. It is 
further presumptuous to think that these organizations would give any 
consideration to the issue in the first place. Arbitral disputes are not at 
the top of these organizations’ agendas vis-à-vis their respective 
governments and any international organizations—let alone 
individual investors—and disputes may not even transpire until many 
years later, when there is nothing to suggest that any of the 
recommendations of business organizations now would be 
representative of the putative investor that may end up before the 
permanent investment court in the future. While investors themselves 
may have a degree of influence, it is not worth much. A right to be 
consulted is equivalent to a ballot paper with a disclaimer that the 
vote may not be counted. 
On the day of the keynote address at the 12th Annual Fordham 
International Arbitration Conference, the authors of this article 
received a copy of a Supplemental Report to the CIDS Report 
(Supplemental Report). The authors of the Supplemental Report 
augment their initial report by providing further analysis on the 
composition of a hypothetical permanent court.95 In their 
Supplemental Report, the authors explained that their proposal in their 
initial CIDS Report “presuppose[s] the creation of multilateral 
permanent adjudicatory bodies, the ITI [i.e., International Tribunal for 
Investments] and/or the AM [i.e., Appeals Mechanism], whereby the 
former would provide an alternative to the current ad hoc system of 
investor-State arbitration and the latter would supplement it.”96 
The Supplemental Report identifies three consequences of 
transitioning from the current “ad hoc system”—which is understood 
to refer to a dispute resolution body constituted on a case-by-case 
basis for a single dispute97—to a permanent or semi-permanent body 
on the arbitrator-selection process. Of those three, the first is relevant 
for our purposes. The Supplemental Report acknowledges that the 
 
94. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58, at ¶ 168. 
95. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 93, at ¶ 2. 
96. Id. ¶ 6. 
97. Id. ¶ 7. 
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unilateral right of party-appointment would be eliminated if the 
appointing power rests exclusively on States: 
The first consequence is the transition from a disputing party 
framework to a treaty or contracting party framework. 
Transitioning from an ad hoc system that allows virtually 
complete control over composition by the disputing parties to 
a permanent or semi-permanent system necessarily reduces 
the role for disputing parties and conversely increases that of 
treaty parties. As the dispute resolution body must exist before 
the investment dispute arises, it must necessarily be established 
ex ante by the treaty parties. This entails moving beyond the 
“historical keystone” of arbitration, namely disputing party 
appointment, to a different selection method placed entirely or 
predominantly in the hands of the parties to the instrument 
establishing the new adjudicatory bodies. Such dilution of 
powers concerns all disputing parties, including respondent 
States who lose the “right” to influence the composition of the 
body as disputing parties. However, in practice, it will be 
perceived as affecting the investor-party more heavily, as 
States will be able to contribute to the composition of the 
body in their capacity of treaty parties.98 
The tilting of the scales in favor of States is in no way 
diminished by the fact that the respondent-State in an investment 
dispute also is deprived of the opportunity to select an arbitrator once 
the dispute is afoot. While the authors of the Supplemental Report 
acknowledge this fact, the consequences of it are indeed minimal, if 
not infinitesimal. 
Furthermore, the Supplemental Report seems to acknowledge 
more clearly the particular hurdles involved in a “selection” process 
of this type and magnitude: 
The guarantees for judicial independence in existing courts 
provide helpful starting points in this respect. However, they 
may not be sufficient or at least not entirely transposable as 
such to investor-State dispute settlement, in which the 
asymmetric nature is such that only one type of the future 
disputing parties controls the selection process. Designing an 
appropriate selection process that, inter alia, ensures the requisite 
independence of the adjudicators thus appears to be of even 
greater concern in a setting of this kind. 
 
98. Id. ¶ 14 (emphasis added). 
812 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:791 
As the practice at existing permanent international courts and 
tribunals shows, the involvement of States (and, within the State 
apparatus, in particular of State governments) may lead to risks 
of politicization of the selection process . . . . Appointment on 
the basis of political considerations rather than competence and 
merit may undermine the quality of the decisions and, ultimately, 
the perception of the adjudicatory body’s independence, 
credibility and legitimacy.99 
Ensuring that the “selection” process is multi-layered, open to all 
stakeholders, and transparent, sounds good in theory, until one 
realizes that in substance what is being proposed is that States 
constitute an advisory panel to sign off on the qualifications of 
potential candidates and “consult[] national parliaments” to “reinforce 
the democratic element in the process.”100 
B. UNCITRAL Working Group III 
In July 2017 the UNCITRAL Commission met and decided, on 
the basis of the CIDS Report, to have Working Group III, as it is 
called at UNCITRAL — not Working Group II — consider the report 
at its next meeting.101 The Working Group III was entrusted with the 
task to consider ISDS reform “so as not to burden Working Group II 
unduly while it continued to fulfil its mandate [of its work on the 
enforcement of settlement agreements resulting from international 
commercial conciliation].”102 It is curious that this task has been 
assigned by UNCITRAL just last year to Working Group III, which 
previously has dealt with international legislation on shipping, 
transport law, and, only most recently, online dispute resolution, and 
not to Working Group II, which for the past seventeen years has dealt 
exclusively and broadly with arbitration, conciliation and dispute 
settlement, and in which, inter alia, the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules and the UNCITRAL Model Law were incubated. Furthermore, 
the Commission emphasized that delegations to Working Group III 
should be government-led, while noting the benefits of involving 
diverse stakeholders.103 One asks, “What is the reason that the 
 
99.   Id. ¶¶ 106-08 (emphasis added). 
100. Id. ¶¶ 111-16. 
101.  Id. ¶¶ 106-08. 
102. G.A. Rep. of the Comm. on Int’l Trade Law of Its Fiftieth Session, at ¶ 260,  U.N. 
Doc. A/72/17 (July 3-21, 2017). 
103. Id. ¶¶ 250-51, 264. 
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UNCITRAL Commission has assigned consideration of the EU-
inspired International Investment Court proposal, not to the Working 
Group with by far the most extensive experience with international 
arbitration, but rather to one whose exposure to the field has been 
limited to online arbitration, along with shipping and transport law? 
Why is it charged to have predominately government delegations? 
Are the dice being loaded?” 
The first Working Group III session following the Commission’s 
July 2017 decision, held in Vienna from November 27 to December 
1, 2017,104 revealed a telling picture of the work now being political, 
rather than, as is traditional with Working Groups, being technical 
work of experts. Virtually two of the five days of the meeting were 
taken up with a fight over who should chair the meeting, an issue 
hitherto always resolved by consensus.105 Incredibly, the many EU 
Member States Delegations present carried the day for the election of 
a senior official of Canada106 who by definition is bound to CETA, 
and hence to the EU International Investment Court imbedded in 
CETA. Can there be any doubt but that UNCITRAL itself is being 
politicized and that, as noted above, the dice in fact have been loaded? 
Nevertheless reluctant delegates grappled with the monumental task 
of reforming ISDS, and Part I of the Working Group III Report from 
that session emphasized perceived concerns of some States over the 
cost and duration of proceedings.107 Several of the more sober-minded 
participants in the session argued that deliberations relating to 
duration and cost should be fact based.108 The Working Group 
ultimately settled on a compromise, recording that perceptions are 
also relevant in maintaining the “legitimacy” of ISDS, the ubiquitous 
buzzword that Professor Christoph Schreuer recently decried as “one 
of those Humpty Dumpty words designed to arouse pleasurable 
 
104. U.N. Comm. On Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Working Group III on the Work of Its 
Thirty-Fourth Session, Part I, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930 (2017). 
105. Anthea Roberts, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reform: Not Business as Usual, BLOG OF 
THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reform-not-
business-as-usual/ [https://perma.cc/97PV-YBYW] (“In the whole history of UNCITRAL 
[established in 1966], only one issue had ever been put to the vote and that was the decision on 
whether to move the headquarters of UNCITRAL to Vienna [from New York City]. The 
premium placed on consensus meant that voting enjoyed somewhat of a mystical taboo. That 
was, at least, until this meeting when the spell was broken for a second time.”). 
106. U.N. Comm. On Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Working Group III on the Work of Its 
Thirty-Fourth Session, supra note 104, at ¶ 14.  
107. Id. ¶¶ 30-48. 
108. Id. ¶ 35. 
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emotions without conveying meaning” in his keynote address at the 
Investment Treaty Arbitration Conference in Prague on October 26, 
2017.109 Some less radical reforms, namely those of clarifying a 
tribunal’s powers of cost apportionment and ordering claimants to 
post security for costs in certain scenarios, were also discussed,110 
mirroring recommendations made by Professor Schreuer in his 
speech.111 
V. FEAR AND OVERREACTION 
Now, why is this happening? As mentioned earlier, the EU-
pursued International Investment Court is just the paramount move in 
a longstanding series of moves by States to repossess investor-State 
arbitration and what should be a matter between investors and their 
host States. It is fear. That is number one. When Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt was sworn into office the first time early in 1933, the 
United States was in the depths of the Depression, which greatly 
affected the generation of people living during that time. President 
Roosevelt said, “We have nothing to fear but fear itself.”112 Fear is a 
poor advisor, hence an inappropriate driving force in contemporary 
international investment arbitration. 
Take environmental and health cases, for example. To our 
knowledge, no ISDS tribunal has ever found a legitimately 
environmental or health law or regulation of a State to have breached 
a BIT or a multilateral investment treaty. But there are still outcries. 
Take the Ethyl case,113 in which one of the authors of this Article was 
appointed by Ethyl in the late 1990s. It was the first NAFTA case 
against Canada.114 That case involved a bill that was introduced in the 
Canadian Parliament in May of 1995 and enacted as the Act on April 
 
109. Marie Talašová Jaroslav Kudrna, Sebastian Perry & Laetitia Nappert-Rosales., 
There’s “no alternative” to investment arbitration, says Schreuer, GLOBAL ARBITRATION 
REVIEW, (Dec. 22, 2017), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1151619/theres-no-
alternative-to-investment-arbitration-says-schreuer [http://perma.cc/539Q-DPEQ]. 
110.  Caron, supra note 88, at ¶¶ 46-49 & 59-61. 
111.  Talašová, supra note 109. 
112.  Donald Pohlmeyer, FDR Nothing to Fear But Fear Itself 1933 Inaugural Address, 
YOUTUBE (Sep. 23, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHFTtz3uucY 
[http://perma.cc/QNL4-C6G8]. 
113. See generally Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL (June 24, 1998). 
        114.  Laura Eggertson, Ethyl sues Ottawa over MMT law, THE FINANCIAL POST, Sept. 
11, 1996, http://appletonlaw.com/files/Ethyl/media%20clippings.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7E9-
QS53] 
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25, 1997, that prohibited the commercial importation of and 
interprovincial trade in Methylcyclopentadienyl Manganese 
Tricarbonyl (“MMT”), a fuel additive (the “MMT Act”).115 Ethyl 
commenced NAFTA arbitration proceedings in April 1997, arguing 
that the measure was illegitimate and discriminatory.116 Canada 
argued that while MMT was designed to increase octane in gasoline, 
it affected emission control on automobiles, thereby presenting an 
environmental hazard due to manganese becoming airborne.117 
The arbitration was short-lived. Following the Tribunal’s 
unanimous ruling in June 1998 rejecting some of Canada’s objections 
to its jurisdiction and joining others to the merits118 the case was 
settled for US$13 million.119 The decision confirming the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction came less than two weeks after a domestic Canadian 
panel convened under Canada’s Agreement on Internal Trade 
(“AIT”), concluded with its Provinces and Territories,120 had 
undermined Canada’s position in defending the Ethyl case. The 
Government of Alberta had commenced proceedings under the AIT 
alleging that the MMT Act failed to comply with Canada’s 
obligations under the AIT, whereupon the Governments of Québec, 
Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan intervened as Complainants in 
support of Alberta.121 A majority of the AIT panel hearing the case 
ruled that the MMT Act was inconsistent with certain provisions of 
the AIT and recommended that Canada remove the inconsistencies 
and, pending such removal, “that the Respondent [i.e., Canada] 
suspend the operation of the Act with respect to interprovincial 
trade.”122 Canada was left without a leg on which to stand vis-à-vis 
Ethyl, hence, the US$13 million settlement. 
 
115.    See generally Ethyl Corp., NAFTA/CITRAL.  
116.   Id.  
117. See Luke Eric Peterson & Kendra Magraw, Looking Back: Ethyl v. Canada case 
drew early public attention to previously obscure arbitration process, and settled after 
tribunal’s jurisdiction ruling, IAREPORTER (Mar. 21, 2017), 
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/looking-back-ethyl-v-canada-case-drew-early-public-
attention-to-previously-obscure-arbitration-process-and-settled-after-tribunals-jurisdiction-
ruling/ [http://perma.cc/9UF7-DXBR];John Geddes, Ethyl sues Ottawa for US$200M over 
MMT ban, THE FIN. POST, Sept. 11, 1996, at 6.  
118. See generally Ethyl Corp., NAFTA/CITRAL.  
119.  Daphne Eviatar, The NAFTA Edge, THE AM. LAW. 80, 83 (2005). 
120. Gov. of Alberta v. Canada, Article 1704 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between 
Alberta and Canada Regarding the Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act, 13 (June 12, 1998). 
121.  See id. 
122. See id at 1. 
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Despite the brevity of the proceedings and the AIT panel’s 
preceding decision adverse to the Canadian Government, the Ethyl 
case attracted widespread media attention and evoked a vociferous 
public backlash at the time.123 
At the time, the media maintained that NAFTA Chapter 11 
proceedings constituted a “regulatory chill” restricting Canada’s 
sovereignty, as demonstrated by the settlement with Ethyl and the 
repealing of the MMT Act.124 Contrary to this widespread 
misconception, Canada was motivated to settle the Ethyl case because 
of the AIT panel decision. Faced with the AIT’s decision scuttling the 
MMT Act, Canada had no alternative but to settle with Ethyl. This is 
confirmed by Canada’s official governmental website in which it 
describes the outcome of the Ethyl case as follows: 
Settlement of the claim 
Further to a challenge launched by three [sic] Canadian provinces 
under the Agreement on Internal Trade, a Canadian federal-
provincial dispute settlement panel found that the federal 
measure was inconsistent with certain provisions of that 
Agreement. Following this decision, Canada and Ethyl settled all 
outstanding matters, including the Chapter Eleven claim.125 
 
123. See Geddes, supra note 117; Michael Valpy, How free trade threatens democracy, 
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Apr. 9, 2001), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/how-free-
trade-threatens-democracy/article760604/ [https://perma.cc/T36X-QTNV];SCOTT SINCLAIR, 
CANADA’S TRACK RECORD UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER 11: NORTH AMERICAN INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTES TO JANUARY 2018 11 (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2018)  
(describing the latest misconceptions on Ethyl). 
124.  See generally Ethyl Corp., NAFTA/CITRAL.  
         125. We note that the official Canadian Government website describing the Ethyl 
Corporation v. Government of Canada case identifies “three Canadian provinces.”   See Gov. 
of Canada, NAFTA – Chapter 11 – Investment, Cases filed against the Government of Canada: 
Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA (last modified Dec. 
21, 2017), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-
domaines/disp-diff/ethyl.aspx?lang=eng#archived [https://perma.cc/5PTW-7XRF]. However, 
according to the AIT Panel decision, four provinces were Complainants. But see Gov. of 
Alberta v. Canada, Article 1704 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between Alberta and Canada 
Regarding the Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act, at 1 (emphasis added).  
 
The Government of Alberta (the Complainant) contends that the Act fails to 
comply with Canada’s (the Respondent) obligations under the Agreement on 
Internal Trade (the Agreement), and that the inconsistencies cannot be justified 
by reference to the Agreement’s provisions for measures associated with 
legitimate objectives. The Complainant contends that the Act has impaired 
internal trade, caused injury to Alberta refiners, and is inconsistent with 
general and specific provisions of the Agreement. The Governments of 
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Despite the Canadian Government’s straightforward explanation 
as to why it settled the Ethyl case, local politicians continue to 
remember the ordeal differently.126 
The results of the tobacco labeling cases—Philip Morris Brands 
Sàrl, et al. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay and Philip Morris Asia 
Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia—further confirm that no 
health-protection legislation or regulation has been found by any 
ISDS tribunal to have breached any provision of any investment 
treaty.127 The tobacco cases have attracted particular attention of 
critics of investor-State arbitration despite the fact that both Australia 
 
Québec, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan (also Complainants) intervened in 
support of Alberta. The Government of Nova Scotia did not file a written 
submission or present oral arguments. 
126.  Elizabeth May, leader of the Green Party of Canada and MP for Saanich-Gulf 
Islands, held a press conference in September 2012 in which she warned against the adoption 
of the Canada-China Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement. During the 
press conference, she highlighted the controversy that the Ethyl case brought in Canada: 
 
We know the experience of Chapter 11 of NAFTA. Everyone believed and 
including all the groups fighting NAFTA, that Chapter 11 was innocuous. It 
was never raised in the fight over NAFTA and yet the investor-State 
provisions of NAFTA have proven to be the most corrosive of democracy the 
most undermining of Canadian laws it’s only under Chapter 11 of NAFTA that 
a U.S. corporation had the right to claim damages against Canada and cause 
our Governments to repeal laws passed in our Parliament. It was bad enough 
when it was a US multinational, like Ethyl Corporation of Richmond, Virginia, 
getting laws against its toxic gasoline additive MMT cancelled. But how much 
worse is it to imagine that the Communist Chinese Government out of Beijing 
through its various tentacles of Sinopec and PetroChina and CNOOC will be 
able to trump Canadian law through complaints in this process that set out in 
this agreement. 
 
Elizabeth May: Red Carpet For China (Press Conference Q and A), YOUTUBE (Sept. 27, 
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjwjBe8tlAo [https://perma.cc/ZWY9-F2QW]. 
(The Authors of this Article have transcribed the block quotation manually by listening to the 
YouTube clip.  Thus, the block quotation is not an official transcription.)  
Since Elizabeth May’s statement, the treaty entered into force on October 1, 2014 and 
retained an investor-State arbitration provision in article 20. See Canada-China Foreign 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, art. 20; Trade and investment agreements, 




127.   See generally Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, et al. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 590(July 8, 2016); Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The 
Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, sec. VII (Dec. 17, 2015). 
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and Uruguay won those cases.128 Even if cases come out in favor of 
States the critics disregard the result and emphasize the alleged bias 
towards investors in the ISDS system.129 When a majority of the 
tribunal in Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, et al. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay found in favor of the State, rather than recognize that ISDS 
works, the critics turned their attention to the hefty fees collected by 
ISDS lawyers and how the case should not have been brought in the 
first place.130 They look right past the unchallengeable fact, as 
illustrated by the NAFTA case cited above and the tobacco cases, that 
States’ “policy space” universally has been preserved by ISDS 
tribunals. 
A. Separating Facts from Fiction 
Prominent people, and publications that one might think should 
know better, had they done the necessary research, have spoken out 
emphatically against ISDS.131 States win the majority of cases that are 
tried to an award. From 1987 through July 2017, 530 ISDS cases have 
been concluded.132 Of those cases 37% were decided in favor of the 
State (the claims were dismissed either for lack of jurisdiction or on 
the merits) and 27% were decided in favor of the investor.133 
Furthermore, 23% of the 530 cases were settled, 11% were 
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IIA ISSUES NOTE, ISSUE 3, at 4 (Nov. 2017) http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAJ6-7CQP]. 
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discontinued, and in 2% of the cases there was a finding of liability, 
but no damages were awarded.134 
VI. CONCLUSION 
ISDS as a dispute resolution system is a service given by States 
to the benefit of its citizens and corporations in the future. No 
individual or corporation concerns itself with disputes prior to one 
arising. In other words, ISDS is not an issue that is at the top of the 
agenda of corporations. A paragraph from the October 24, 2017, New 
York Times from the article titled, “‘Army’ of Lobbyists Hits Capitol 
Hill to Preserve Nafta”135 encapsulates this point. On that day, more 
than 130 high executives of large U.S. companies were sent “to 
ratchet up pressure on lawmakers — many of whose constituents 
work for companies dependent on Nafta — to keep the deal intact.”136 
The article further states: 
Bill Lane, the chairman of the Trade Leadership Coalition, which 
advocates preserving Nafta, said that until recently businesses 
had been largely silent on Nafta because they did not want to 
undercut other policy priorities, such as rewriting the tax code to 
secure a lower corporate tax rate.137 
Lane continues: “‘But they also realize it doesn’t matter what the 
tax rate is if you’re not competitive, and Nafta makes North American 
manufacturing competitive.’”138 The statement came too little, too 
late, because bigger priorities let it go. 
What is the result going to be? One of two things will happen: 
An International Investment Court will be established or it will not. 
Hopefully, it will not be established. If it is, the large corporations 
that invest in high-risk countries abroad have considerable bargaining 
strength and, just as they did in the 1960s and 1970s, may opt to 
negotiate their own dispute-settlement provision via contract, 
presumably to their satisfaction. 
Relatively smaller investors in foreign countries do not have the 
same clout. One of two things will happen, both to the disadvantage 
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of the host States. If this court is established, the smaller investors 
either will not invest at all — that is a loss for everybody involved — 
or, if they do invest, when they are determining the return on 
investment that they need to project to realize from this investment, 
the risk factor will go up for want of a decent dispute-settlement 
mechanism available should the host State violate the substantive 
provisions of an applicable treaty. 
The cost of foreign investment will be vastly more expensive, 
which is largely due to an unnecessarily excessive risk factor. And, 
the host State loses again. It receives the investment, but at an 
extravagant rate compared to what it would have had had the 
investors not been put in this situation. A telling example is the 
revised position of the new President of Ecuador. Ecuador has and 
continues to act as a respondent in investment disputes.139 Ecuador 
has taken steps to distance itself from investor-State arbitration in the 
past, but is now rethinking its stance,140 and, having recently trashed 
or set about trashing all of its BITs,141 Ecuador’s new Minister for 
Foreign Trade, Pablo Campana, has said, “In order to secure private 
direct investment, we must have BITs.”142 So while some people are 
waking up, nightmarish creatures continue to lie in wait, with the 
fifteen-headed hydra the latest myth in need of being dispelled. 
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